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LEGISLATIVE NOTES
THE ILLINOIS COMPENSATION TO
VICTIMS OF CRIME ACT
On June 18, 1973, the Illinois legislature passed two companion bills
designed to provide compensation to victims of violent crime. The pas-
sage of House Bill 269,1 the Crime Victims Compensation Act, and
House Bill 270,2 expanding the jurisdiction of the Illinois Court of Claims
to include claims brought under the Crime Victims Compensation Act,
is the result of several years of legislative work beginning with a feasibil-
ity study initiated in August, 1965.3 A third bill, House Bill 271, 4 de-
signed to amend the Public Meetings Act to permit the Court of Claims
to hold closed hearings in certain cases in the administration of the Crime
Victims Compensation Act, was defeated. The three bills were spon-
sored by Representative Leland H. Rayson (D-Tinley Park) in the Illinois
House and Senator Howard W. Carroll (D-Chicago) in the Illinois Sen-
ate.
While there are several theoretical bases for a compensation to vic-
tims of crime law, the Illinois plan is motivated primarily by a social wel-
fare philosophy emphasizing government programs which are designed
to aid the victims of misfortune.6 Secondary motivations for the Act
1. H.B. 269, as amended, 78th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1973) [hereinafter cited
as H.B. 269]. The Bill was signed into law on August 23, 1973 and became
effective October 1, 1973.
2. H.B. 270, 78th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1973) [hereinafter cited as H.B. 2701.
H.B. 270 was also signed into law on August 23, 1973 and became effective Oc-
tober 1, 1973.
3. For a historical summary and analysis of crime victim compensation
laws see Comment, Compensation to Victims of Violent Crimes, 61 Nw. U.L. REV.
72 (1966).
4. H.B. 271, as amended, 78th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1973) [hereinafter cited as
H.B. 271].
5. ILL. Rnv. STAT. ch. 102, §§ 41 etseq. (1971).
6. Other rationale for a crime victims compensation plan include: (1) the no-
tion that the offender has the duty to make restitution to the victim and that the
state's duty to the victim is to expedite or substitute such relief; and (2) the idea
that the state is liable to the victim for injuries which result from the state's failure
to maintain a reasonable degree of public safety upon which its citizens rely.
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include: (1) better crime statistics, better law enforcement and in-
creased incentives for the victims to report crimes through the require-
ment of prompt reporting for compensation,7 (2) increased cooperation
between victims and law enforcement officials in the apprehension and
prosecution of criminals through the requirement of full cooperation be-
fore compensation,8 (3) protection and encouragement of the "good
samaritan" by allowing such persons to obtain compensation under the
plan,9 (4) the possibility that the state may recover the sums expended
in compensating the victim,10 and (5) improvements in the state penal
system such as allowing expanded work release programs enabling a
prisoner to pay his debt to his victim.
Opponents of the Bill, basically those opposed to the social welfare
philosophy, centered their arguments upon the possible loopholes in the
Bill which could allow false claims. Proponents of the Bill cite work-
men's compensation, veterans' assistance, social security and public as-
sistance programs to support the proposition that the state is committed
to spreading the risk of loss in aid of certain classes of persons. In the
present case, the desire is to alter the approach to crime by affording
justice to the victim as well as to the criminal.
The direct beneficiaries of this legislation are three classes of victims
of certain crimes" and persons dependent upon a deceased victim for
support at the time of death. The Bill does not define the term "depend-
ent." A victim is not entitled to compensation under the Act if he and
his assailant were related and shared the same household.' 2  No time
frame is set in which the fulfillment of these conditions will operate to
deny relief. It is thus unclear, for example, whether the former wife of
an assailant is entitled to compensation for a battery committed by the
See generally Comment, Compensation for Victims of Crime, 33 U. CHI. L. REV.
531 (1966).
7. H.B. 269, § 3(c).
8. H.B. 269, § 3(d).
9. H.B. 269, H9 2(d)(2) and (3).
10. H.B. 269, H9 10(a) and (c).
11. H.B. 269, § 2(d) defines "victim" as a person (1) killed or injured in this
state as a result of a crime of violence perpetrated or attempted against him,
(2) killed or injured in this state while attempting to assist a person against whom a
crime of violence is being perpetrated or attempted, if that attempt of assistance
would be expected of a reasonable man under the circumstances, or (3) killed or
injured in this state while assisting a law enforcement official to apprehend a pre-
son who has perpetrated a crime of violence or to prevent the perpetration of any
such crime if that assistance was in response to the express request of the law
enforcement official.
12. H.B. 269, § 3(e).
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former husband upon the former wife subsequent to their divorce. This
provision, no doubt designed as a safeguard against the possibility of col-
lusion and the possibility that the assailant might benefit in the compen-
sation award, is an unfortunate requirement. A large proportion of
crimes causing personal injury or death are committed by relatives of the
victim. 13 As a result, many deserving victims of crime will be denied
compensation due to this unduly strict statutory requirement. While a
party bent on collusion will easily be able to avoid this particular require-
ment, the other provisions of the Act will operate to deny undeserving
relief. 14  Any benefit realized by the provisions designed to preclude
false claims is offset by the Act's harshness. Even though there may be
difficulties attendant upon determining the facts of a violent crime com-
mitted among family members at home, a strict standard of proof would
provide a more equitable system of compensation in cases of this type,
consistent with the purposes of this legislation, than would a general rule
of exclusion.
Section 2(c) of the Act defines the crimes of violence involved in the
compensation scheme. The crimes, defined with reference to the 1961
Criminal Code,15 are: murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, ag-
gravated kidnapping, rape, deviate sexual assault, indecent liberties with
a child, assault, aggravated assault, battery, aggravated battery, reckless
conduct and arson. Injuries due to crimes which occur during a mob
action' are not compensable under the Act.)1 Compensation may be
denied if the injury has been substantially provoked; and provocation to
any degree may affect the amount of the award.18
13. For example, FBI statistics show that in 1972, 25 percent of all murders
were committed within a family. 1972 FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 8.
14. For example, an applicant must promptly notify the appropriate law en-
forcement officials of the perpetration of the crime, H.B. 269 § 3(c), he must fully
cooperate with law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of
the assailant, H.B. 269 § 3(d), and the applicant must have his application re-
viewed by the Court of Claims, H.B. 269 § 5.
15. ILL._.REV. STAT. ch. 38, §9 I et seq. (1961), as amended, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1 etseq. (Supp. 1972).
16. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, H9 25-1 and 25-2 (1971), as amended, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, 9H 25-1 and 25-2 (Supp. 1972).
17. H.B. 269, § 2(c). One explanation for the exclusion of injuries due to
crimes of violence committed during a mob action may be that the state under-
takes to provide, and the citizen may only reasonably rely upon, a reasonable
degree of safety. Injuries due to crimes of violence committed during a mob ac-
tion are thus beyond those for which the state should be liable. A second possible
explanation for this provision is that it is the result of a political compromise
needed to placate law and order legislators opposed to the bill who feared a
drain on the state's treasury at the direction of riot leaders.
18. H.B. 269, § 7(c).
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In considering the amount of compensation to which a victim is enti-
tled, the Court of Claims "need not consider whether or not the alleged
assailant has been apprehended or brought to trial nor the result of any
criminal proceedings against the person."'1  Critics of the plan have ex-
pressed concern that this provision will leave the state subject to a host
of false claims. For example, an individual whose injury has not re-
suited from criminal action might make a claim for an award under the
present Act. But such a false claim will face additional safeguarding re-
quirements of the Act 20 and a determination by the Court of Claims.
The helpless victim whose assailant has fled should not be required to
await his capture and conviction to be entitled to relief.
An interesting question arises in considering the authority of the Court
of Claims to disregard the result of a criminal proceeding against the al-
leged assailant: What is the effect of a prior acquittal by reason of in-
fancy, insanity or intoxication upon the victim's claim for relief? The
provision noted above would presumably authorize the Court of Claims
to ignore such a result and award compensation to the victim. But it
appears possible, by strict adherence to criminal law principles, to find
that no crime of violence was in fact committed if the perpetrator lacked
the mental state required by the criminal law as an element of the crime.
In operation, however, such a finding would be repugnant to the pur-
poses of the legislation, since an acquittal for lack of criminal intent
merely reflects a social policy that an otherwise criminal act should be
excused and the perpetrator not held criminally responsible for its com-
mission.
As a corollary to consideration of victims' rights, the rights of the al-
leged assailant to a fair trial should in no way be compromised by the
award of compensation to his alleged victim. The Act provides protec-
tion for the alleged assailant by allowing for a closed hearing if he has
not been brought to trial and a public hearing would adversely affect
his trial,2 1 and by disallowing the use of the hearing transcript for any
purpose in a criminal proceeding except one against an individual for
perjury in testimony before the Court of Claims. 22 It remains to be seen
whether in operation these two provisions will afford sufficient protection
to the alleged assailant in his criminal trial. It should be noted that the
defeat of House Bill 271 in the Illinois legislature presents a vagary in the
Illinois law in that a closed hearing under section six of the Crime Vic-
19. H.B. 269, § 7(a).
20. H.B. 269, §§ 3(c), 3(d) and 5.
21. H.B. 269, § 6(a).
22. H.B. 269, § 6.
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tims Compensation Act would presumably be prohibited by the terms of
the Public Meetings Act. 23
In order to be entitled to compensation, an applicant must have sus-
tained a pecuniary loss of $500 or more. Pecuniary loss includes,
in the case of injury, appropriate medical expenses or hospital expenses,
loss of earnings, loss of future earnings because of a disibility resulting
from the injury . . . and, in addition, in the case of death, funeral and
burial expenses and loss of support to the dependants of the victim. 24
Child support payments for the benefit of a child conceived as a result
of the rape of its mother are not allowed. Pain and suffering, and prop-
erty damage are not to be included in determining pecuniary loss. 25
The maximum award available to an applicant is $10,000.26
The minimum claim requirement of $500 is unfortunately high. Al-
though designed to further guard against false and/or frivolous claims,
the minimum claim requirement will no doubt operate to deny relief to
many deserving applicants. In a recent study of the operation of the
New York compensation plan, which has a $100 minimum, 27 it was
found that the largest number of applications for compensation are re-
jected because they do not meet the minimum claim requirement. 28
While it may be reasonable to set a minimum claim requirement so that
administrative costs in handling a claim do not exceed the amount of
the claim involved, the denial of an otherwise valid claim for any other
reason appears to be both unjustified and unwise.
In determining the amount of the final award, the plan provides for
the deduction of workmen's compensation awards and funds to which
the victim is entitled under local governmental, state or federal plans. 29
However, the Act does not provide for the deduction of private insur-
ance payments. The exclusion of pain and suffering in the determina-
tion of awards is designed to preclude payment for unduly speculative
injuries and to avoid making the program much more complex and
costly than it is at present. Additionally, an inclusion of pain and suf-
fering in the computation of loss would undoubtedly place a premium
upon legal services in the pressing of a claim before the Court of Claims.
23. ILL. RIv. STAT. ch. 102, §§ 41 et seq. (1971).
24. H.B. 269, § 4.
25. Id.
26. H.B. 269, § 7(e).
27. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 626 (McKinney 1972).
28. Edelletz, Geis, Chappell, and Sulton, Public Compensation of Victims oj
Crime: A Survey of the New York Experience, 9 CRIM. LAw BuLL. 5, 45 (1973).
29. H.B. 269, § 5(g).
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Property damage is similarly excluded based upon the additional consid-
eration that an individual who has suffered property loss is likely to
have it privately insured.
The Act allows for the grant of an award upon the condition that the
recipient subrogate his right to civil damages against the assailant to the
state.8 0 If there has been no subrogation, the state has a charge for the
amount of compensation paid under the plan. 81
Attorney's fees for representation at a hearing under the Act are sub-
ject to approval by the Court of Claims. It is hoped that the need for
attorneys may be minimized in the operation of the plan by adminis-
tering the plan in a non-adversary manner. In addition, since the Court
of Claims is to administer the plan, a dissatisfied applicant may petition
the court for a new trial, 32 but judicial review of the Court of Claims
determination is not available.33 Finally, appropriations for the plan are
to be made following an award by the Court of Claims, 8 4 such an award
being a claim or charge against the state.
Illinois joins at least eight other states which have some form of com-
pensation to victims of crime legislation,"3 although the Illinois Act as
presently constituted is certainly not a model piece of legislation. It
seems clear that the concept of crime victims compensation is in itself
sound. A crucial factor in its usefulness is public awareness of its avail-
ability. Those features of the Act which appear to constitute loopholes
and those features which seem unduly harsh may be remedied within a
few years by the amendatory process and judicial interpretation.
Arnold H. Landis
30. H.B. 269, § 10(a).
31. H.B. 269, § 10(c).
32. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 439.15 (1971).
33. ILL. Rxv. STAT. ch. 37, § 439.17 (1971).
34. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 439.23 (1971).
35. Alaska (1972); California (1966); Georgia (1972); Hawaii (1967); Mary-
land (1968); Massachusetts (1968); New Jersey (1971); and New York (1967).
19731 497
